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Abstract
We analyze the eects of corruption and institutional quality on the quality of business
regulation. Our key ndings indicate that corruption negatively aects the quality of
regulation and that general institutional quality is insignicant once corruption is con-
trolled for. These ndings hold over a number of specications which include additional
exogenous historical and geographic controls. The ndings imply that policy-makers
should focus on curbing corruption to improve regulation, over wider institutional re-
form.
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11 Introduction
Regulations shape a wide range of economic activity. Indeed, it is hard to think of an area
of economic activity in the formal sector that is not shaped by regulation to some degree.
However, the extent of regulation can dier dramatically across countries. In some parts
of the world, starting a business and paying taxes are costly and time-consuming exercises
that make it dicult for societies to operate eciently. In other parts, ecient business
regulations contribute to economic development and prosperity.1 Ecient regulation of
the business environment should result in fewer bureaucratic procedures or less \red tape".
Consequently, well regulated business environments will impose fewer transaction costs on
individuals and rms, allowing them to operate more eciently. It is not only the quantity of
red tape that matters, the quality of existing regulation should help to attract investment,
as investors often use information on the state of the business environment to judge the
expected risk and returns from investment.2
There is a substantial debate in economics on the appropriate extent to which government
should intervene to regulate economic activity. The consensus among most economists is
that governments should regulate to address market failures. However, dierences persist
over the extent to which market failures are a problem, with many economists arguing that
excessive regulation strangles economic development. While the debate over the appropriate
extent of regulation is ongoing, several authors have theorised that the key determinants
of existing poor regulation and misgovernance, include corruption and poor institutions
(Banerjee (1997); Guriev (2004)).
We contribute to this literature by examining empirically the deep determinants of the
quality of regulation.3 We view a country's existing stock of regulation as a product of its
(relatively) recent history of institutional quality and corruption. Our primary objective is to
untangle the causal eects of each of the respective determinants of regulation. The results
indicate that the level of corruption is the most important determinant of the quality of the
business environment, trumping the quality of institutions and a range of other indicators.
The paper proceeds as follows. We examine the relationship between regulations, institu-
tions, and corruption, discussing how both institutions and corruption could explain vari-
ation in regulatory outcomes. We then present our methods, data and results. The nal
section concludes with a discussion of our ndings and their relevance.
1To take an example, in Guinea-Bissau it takes 213 days and 19 procedures to start a business. By
contrast, in New Zealand it takes only one day and one procedure.
2For a recent survey of the literature on the eects of business environments on development see Xu
(2010).
3This is similar in spirit to recent work on the determinants of economic growth and development, such
as Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004)
and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004).
22 Motivation
Over the last few years a substantial research programme on the eects of business regula-
tions has produced unambiguous ndings by the standards of social science: the quality of
regulation matters for a range of outcomes. Several authors have demonstrated the impor-
tance of good regulations for economic development and growth (Djankov, McLiesh and Ra-
malho (2006); Gillanders and Whelan (2010)), macroeconomic performance (Loayza, Oviedo
and Serven (2005)), increased productivity and output (Barseghyan (2008); Aghion, Bun-
dell and Grith (2009)), entrepreneurism (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006)), and trade
(Freund and Bolaky (2008)). Considering the far-reaching eect of business regulations on
performance, it is important to investigate why some countries possess eective regulation
while others are buried under excessive red tape. Among the works that have considered
this question, Banerjee (1997) argues that agency problems within government can cause
poor regulation and that such problems are compounded at low levels of development and
bureaucratic quality.
In this section, we discuss the potential eects of both corruption and institutional quality
on regulation in order to ground our empirical strategy in the existing theoretical literature.
According to North (1990), institutions are \the rules of the game in a society." Corruption,
on the other hand, is dened by the World Bank as \the abuse of public power for private
benet." In other words, corruption requires a criminal intent to subvert the rules of the
game. From these simple denitions, it appears that institutions and corruption are distinct
issues.4 One is agent-centred and the other is based on the most enduring aspects of society.
We recognise, however, that in some societies corruption has become so deeply embedded
in social life that it can be viewed as a set of social norms that co-exist alongside formal
institutions. Nevertheless, by denition, corruption is never a legitimate act, no matter how
widely tolerated. Consequently, it is best viewed as a strategy rather than a set of rules.
And, as North (1990:5) argues, it is necessary to separate the rules of the game from players'
strategies in order to conceptualize institutions.
Apart from having a lasting and devastating eect on society, corruption can undermine the
purpose and integrity of regulation. Through bribery, individuals can circumvent regulation,
support harmful deregulation, or preserve the status quo of ineective regulation.5 Corrupt
politicians and bureaucrats can also encourage corruption through inecient regulation that
incentivises individuals and rms to pay bribes. We recognise, however, that the question of
how corruption aects regulation is not always so clear cut. Some authors have speculated
that corruption could \grease the wheels" (Huntington (1968)). Instead of harming economic
4Although this simple denition is useful, there is an extensive literature on the problem of how to dene
corruption. For example see Bardhan (1997).
5For example, Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) nd that corruption reduces the stringency of environ-
mental regulations, but that this eect is dependent on the level of political instability.
3activity, individuals and businesses are able to circumvent inecient regulations through
bribes, hastening the process of starting a business or registering property. Even historically,
some industries have ourished amid widespread corruption. Guriev (2004) examines this
issue, building a theory of corruption and regulation which accounts for both bribes that
reduce red tape and bribes that circumvent red tape. The resulting theoretical model shows
that even though one form of corruption can reduce regulation, the equilibrium level of
regulation remains above the social optimum.
A common thread throughout the literature on corruption and regulation is that the qual-
ity of institutions matters. Institutions have been identied as a leading determinant of
economic development (North (1990); Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004)).6 Good
institutions enforce contracts and protect citizens against expropriation. They should also
provide a more stable business environment as regulations are more frequently and eectively
enforced. As well as producing and enforcing regulations, institutions perform distributive,
representative, and accountability functions. When performing these functions well, good
institutions should foster more accountability among the government agencies that design
and enforce regulations, resulting in more socially optimal business regulations. Further-
more, in the presence of good institutions, interest groups will nd it more dicult to lobby
for regulations (or deregulation) that benets a narrow segment of society at the expense of
the overall business environment.7
The theory of regulatory capture also provides a strong argument linking both corruption and
institutional quality to regulatory outcomes. The regulatory capture approach, pioneered
in Stigler (1971), describes a type of government failure where special interest groups come
to control the state institutions that design and enforce regulations. According to Laont
and Tirole (1991), interest groups can inuence regulation through bribes or the oer future
employment to the ocials and agents who enforce and design regulations. Furthermore,
business interests can cultivate personal relationships with government ocials and can
withhold public criticism of their activities in exchange for favourable treatment (Laont
and Tirole 1991:1091). Finally, interest groups can engage in the lobbying of politicians and
bureaucrats, and indirect transfers such as political campaign contributions (Austen-Smith
(1987)). Good institutions should be able to resist both regulatory capture and the use of
regulation to create and extract rents from the private sector.
To summarise, there are theoretical models which predict that both the prevalence of cor-
ruption and the quality of institutions will be important causal factors in the determination
of regulatory quality. Good institutional frameworks should lead to ecient regulation by
6There is still an ongoing debate over their signicance in terms of growth and development, see Glaeser,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) and Gillanders and Whelan (2010).
7Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) nd that countries with larger, less democratic,
and more interventionist governments regulate business entry more heavily, supporting the view that the
quality of institutions determine the level of regulation.
4relegating special interest groups to a peripheral or secondary role. High levels of corrup-
tion would also seem to lead to poor regulation as actors seek to extract rents. Wherever
regulation exists, some actors will have incentives to change the rules to their advantage, or
circumvent them entirely.
3 Econometric Approach
The above arguments suggest that we wish to estimate models of the following form:
REGi =  + 1INSTi + 2CORRi +  Xi + i (1)
where REGi is a measure of country i's regulatory quality,  is a constant, INSTi is measure
of country i's institutional quality, CORRi is a measure of country i's corruption, Xi contains
exogenous controls and i is an error term of the usual type.
There is a high likelihood of reverse causality in Equation 1. Countries with better regulation
may have closed the door on a lot of corruption. More business friendly economic policies
may also have a direct or indirect eect on institutional quality through the creation of an
ecient class of administrators or through a larger middle class, for example. Thus we utilise
the following rst stage regressions:
INSTi =  + 	1DISTi + 	2FRACi + 	3NSTATi + Xi + i (2)
CORRi =  + 
1DISTi + 
2FRACi + 
3NSTATi + Xi + i (3)
where DISTi is country i's distance from the equator, FRACi is the degree of ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation in country i and NSTATi is an indicator for how \new" the state
is.
Each of these should serve as a good instrument for both institutional quality and corruption
in Equation 1. Distance from the equator is commonly used as an instrument for institu-
tional quality, the idea being that it is a good proxy for exposure to Western European
inuence.8 Ethno-linguistic fractionalisation should inuence both institutions and corrup-
tion through mechanisms such as the sense of nationhood and the prevalence of inter-group
rivalry. Finally, the age of the state should inuence institutional quality and corruption
through many channels such as the time available to put formal rules of conduct in place
and for the machinery of state to emerge. We do not believe that these instruments will have
any role to play in determining business policy outside of their impact on the endogenous
variables in Equation 1.9
8For example Hall and Jones (1999) and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004).
9There is a clear dierence between a state's institutional framework (the machinery of state) and it's
policy outcomes (very loosely, an output of that machinery). While a state's age may aect the former, it is
unlikely to aect the latter directly.
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4 Data
To measure business regulations we make use of data from the World Bank's Doing Business
project. From its database we use a variable that captures the overall ease of doing business
within a country { the Ease of Doing Business Rank. This rank was compiled from indicators
that come from objective surveys which capture the diculty that a hypothetical standard-
ised company would face in starting a business, dealing with construction permits, paying
taxes, employing workers, trading across borders, registering property, enforcing contracts,
and obtaining credit.10 The surveys also capture other aspects of the regulatory environ-
ment, namely the degree to which investors are protected and the recovery rate from business
closure.
10Since we began this work, the ease of employing workers component has come under revision by the
World Bank and is, for the moment, no longer included in their calculations for overall ease of doing busi-
ness. We nd no meaningful dierence between our results which include this component and those which
exclude it and so we opt to leave it in. The two rankings are correlated to the degree of 0.993. The
main dierence is that institutional quality is signicant at the 10% level in our many of our specications
when the ease of employing workers is excluded from the overall ranking and in one case (where we in-
clude legal origin controls) at 5%. The World Bank's discussion of the need for revisions can be found at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/employing-workers
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7This variable covers a far greater range of economic activity than other proxies for economic
policy such as openness to international trade. It also has the advantage over other policy
variables in that governments have direct control over business regulation. Thus one could
read our work more generally as examining the determinants of economic policy with business
policies serving as a proxy for general economic policy. We use the most recent ranking which
was created from data collected over the period 2008-2009.
As a proxy for the quality of a country's institutions we use a variable measuring the con-
straints on executive power from the POLITY IV dataset averaged over the period 2000-2009.
This variable measures \the extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making pow-
ers of the chief executive, whether an individual or a collective executive" (Marshall and
Jaggers (2008)). The variable captures the degree of checks and balances on a seven point
scale from unlimited executive authority to executive parity of subordination. Glaeser, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) argue that this a better measure of the quality
of a country's institutions than some other commonly used measures. Previous authors have
employed variables that measure expropriation risk or the rule of law. According to Glaeser
et. al., executive constraints is less prone to measure outcomes (such as corruption).11 Fig-
ure 1 shows that there is a relationship between the quality of business regulation and our
preferred measure of institutional quality, though it is not a very strong one. It seems it
is possible to have good institutions and a dicult business environment. As a robustness
check, we employ the Rule of Law variable from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) project as an alternative measure of institutional quality. All the WGI
indicators we use take values between -2.5 and +2.5.
For our measure of corruption we use Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions
Index. This index measures the \perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries
and territories around the world".12 We again average this over the period 2000-2009. We
employ the World Bank's WGI Control of Corruption variable as an alternative measure.
It has been argued that the Corruption Perceptions Index and WGI Control of Corrup-
tion variables are the best measures of corruption currently available (Razandrakoto and
Roubaud (2010)). Figure 2 plots Doing Business Rank against the Corruption Perceptions
Index. We observe a more robust relationship than in Figure 1. Countries with high levels
of corruption (low scores) tend to have worse business policies.
We have already argued above that corruption and institutional quality are conceptually
distinct. The econometric issue is whether the correlation between the two is too high. If
so, this multicollinearity will mean that our regressions cannot isolate the eects that we
are interested in. In practice, the correlation between our preferred measures is 0.55 and,
as illustrated in Figure 3, there are many countries with high levels of corruption and good
11Though they also show that it is not a perfect measure either.
12http://www.transparency.org/policy research/surveys indices/cpi/2009
8institutions, though the reverse is not as common. Countries such as India, Italy, Paraguay
and Singapore seem to provide us with sucient variation.
Our data covers 100 countries. All additional variables are dened fully in Appendix A.
5 Determinants of Business Regulation
5.1 Main Specications
We begin with the simplest specication of our model which uses our preferred measures of
institutions and corruption and no additional variables. Table 1 presents the results. The
rst three columns of Panel A are simple OLS estimates and are likely to be contaminated
by endogeneity. Nevertheless, they do suggest that there is some relationship between our
regressors and regulatory quality. All coecients are negatively signed as one would expect
if better institutional and corruption scores lead to a better ranking. It is also worth noting
that adding institutional quality to a regression that includes corruption (i.e. the move from
Column 2 to 3) barely increases the R2. This indicates that corruption may be a more
important factor.
Columns 4, 5 and 6 present our IV estimates. In most cases, our regressions pass the test
of over-identifying restrictions { only when we exclude corruption in Column 4 do we see a
signicant test statistic. This indicates that some of the instruments may be operating on
business policy outside of their eect on institutional quality. Given that we pass the test
once we include corruption, we can take this as initial evidence that corruption plays a role
in determining business policy.
We can see from Panel B that the rst stage ts are good enough for us to dismiss concerns
about weak instruments. These rst stage regressions are interesting in their own right. As
one would expect given the arguments underlying the use of distance from the equator as
an instrument (and as others have found), countries with climes more suited to European
colonies tend to have better institutions and lower levels of (perceived) corruption. Con-
versely, being a relatively new state has a deleterious impact on institutional quality and the
prevalence of corruption. It is interesting that ethno-linguistic fractionalisation is insigni-
cant in both rst stage regressions { corruption does not seem to be more of a problem in
more fragmented societies, nor does institutional quality seem to be lower.
9Table 1: Key Determinants of Ease of Doing Business Rank
Panel A: Main Specications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Constant 189.481 182.878 199.124 259.088 182.780 209.593
(13.012) (5.763) (8.063) (26.035) (8.124) (19.662)
Constraints on -17.852 -4.747 -31.258 -8.868
Executive Power (2.408) (1.873) (4.589) (6.276)
Corruption -20.652 -18.637 -20.629 -16.015
Perceptions Index (0.987) (1.237) (1.554) (3.733)
R2 0.32 0.71 0.72
Over-ID Test P-Value 0.02 0.31 0.64
Panel B: First Stage Regressions
Dependent Variable: Constraints on Executive Power Corruption Perceptions Index
Constant 5.653 2.541
(0.402) (0.529)




New State -0.779 -0.347
(0.177) (0.167)
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.55
F Statistic 27.27 47.91
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is the Ease of Doing Business Rank 2010. In Panel A, Columns (1), (2) and (3) contain OLS
estimates and Columns (4), (5) and (6) contain IV estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. N = 100. , and indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
10The IV results follow a very similar pattern to that observed in the OLS results. Institutions
play a signicant role in determining the quality of business regulation when corruption is
excluded. However, once corruption enters the specication, institutions are insignicant.
This suggests that it is not the \rules of the game" that matter but the degree to which
these rules are broken. The magnitude of the corruption coecient tells us that each step
on the Corruption Perceptions Index tends to be worth approximately sixteen places in the
Doing Business rankings.13
This has a clear policy implication. If institutional quality in general is not a factor, then
to reform business regulation it is sucient to tackle \cheaters" and it is not necessary to
attempt the dicult task of wholesale institutional reform. That is, it is possible to have a
country with good economic policy and poor institutions as long as the degree to which the
rules are broken is curbed.
Of course, we are not claiming that institutional quality is unimportant. Good institutions
are probably desirable for their own sake. Also, institutional quality may play a role in
reducing corruption levels. Indeed, as is illustrated in Figure 3, there does appear to be
some association between low corruption and good institutions. Previous empirical research
has shown that variation in political institutions strongly inuences the prevalence of cor-
ruption.14 We will not pursue this any further here as it is an important question in its own
right. Our results merely claim that once one controls for corruption levels, institutional
quality is irrelevant with regards to business regulation.15
5.2 Robustness
To see if this interesting result is robust to competing explanations, we must introduce some
exogenous controls. Before we do so, it is prudent to examine whether our results are robust
to alternative measures of institutional quality and corruption. This is particularly necessary
with regards to institutions as gures 1 and 3 show that a large proportion of our sample
(35%) achieve a perfect constraints on executive power score.
Table 2 uses the World Bank's Rule of Law (RL) and Control of Corruption (CC) measures
as alternatives to our preferred measures. Both variables take values between  2:5 and
+2:5 and we use the 2008 data.16 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 substitute these in one at
13The size of the estimated coecients on corruption are very similar in our OLS and 2SLS estimates
which suggests that reverse causality is not a major concern in terms of corruption and regulation. This
lends some support to the OLS results of Aghion, Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer (2010), though they examine
the impact of distrust on regulatory outcomes as opposed to perceived corruption.
14For example Lederman, Loayza and Soares (2005) and Treisman (2000).
15Including a corruption*institutions interaction term yields no evidence that the impact of corruption is
curbed (or indeed increased) in good institutional settings.
16Similar results are obtained using the average over the 2000s.
11Table 2: Robustness I: Alternative Measures of Institutions and Corruption
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 283.448 138.685 99.401
(107.049) (33.800) (4.548)








Over-ID Test P-Value 0.41 0.69 0.55
Notes: The dependent variable is the Ease of Doing Business Rank 2010. Estimation carried out using IV. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. N = 100. The first stage F Statistics for Constraints on Executive Power, Corruption Perceptions Index, Rule of Law
and Control of Corruption are 27.27, 47.91, 53.47 and 47.91 respectively. , and indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels respectively.
a time while Column 3 uses both simultaneously. Using RL as an alternative measure of
institutional quality reduces the signicance of the corruption coecient to the 10% level.
This drop in signicance may be due to the fact that RL contains information on perceptions
of corruption.17 Using CC does not change our result or even the signicance level. Finally,
using both simultaneously reduces the signicance of our main result to the 10% level. This
drop in signicance when using RL aside, these regressions suggest that our results are not
overly dependent on the particular measure used.18
There is also an issue as to whether the raw Ease of Doing Business Rank is an acceptable
left hand side econometric variable. Using a ranking means that the dierence between 20th
and 30th place has the same meaning as the dierence between 150th and 160th. This need
not be the case. Were we using a ranking as an explanatory variable, we could allow for
17Part of the denition of RL is \capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have condence in
and abide by the rules of society." See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) for a full denition and
details.
18The result also holds at 1% if we use the POLITY IV measure of democracy as our measure of institu-
tional quality and at 10% if we use Freedom House's Civil Liberties Index. Results available on request.
12Table 3: Robustness II: Alternative Measure of Ease of Doing Business
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 204.417 151.871 172.075 231.445 125.790 95.879
(18.757) (5.583) (12.678) (70.193) (20.809) (3.124)
Constraints on -21.312 -6.681 -6.237
Executive Power (3.317) (3.807) (4.002)
Corruption -13.941 -10.465 -32.205
Perceptions Index (1.130) (2.343) (16.046)
Rule of Law 39.921 36.227
(35.260) (30.953)
Control of Corruption -23.086 -65.859
(5.198) (30.424)
Over-ID Test P-Value 0.03 0.17 0.73 0.43 0.79 0.60
Notes: The dependent variable is the Ease of Doing Business Score 2010. Estimation carried out using IV. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. N = 100. The first stage F Statistics for Constraints on Executive Power, Corruption Perceptions Index, Rule of Law
and Control of Corruption are 27.27, 47.91, 53.47 and 47.91 respectively. , and indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels respectively.
non-linearities by including rank2 and rank3 terms. In our case we must take a dierent
approach.
By taking the averages over the individual rankings we obtain what we call the Ease of
Doing Business Score. The dierence between this and the ranking is that we don't rank
the values after averaging over the categories. Thus, the dierence between 20th and 30th in
the rankings in terms of the score they are allocated can be dierent from the dierence in
the scores of the 150th and 160th ranked countries. The score takes values between 5.2 and
157.7 with a mean of 93.8.
Table 3 examines whether this modication to the Doing Business variable changes our key
results. Columns 1, 2 and 3 show results that are very close to those in Table 1. The only
change is that institutional quality is signicant at the 10% level, even when corruption is
included. The remaining columns use our alternative measures of institutional quality and
corruption and once again our core result emerges.19
19Though once again we see a drop in signicance which is likely due to the pressence of information on
corruption in the Rule of Law variable.
13So far we have considered only two potential explanations of a good business environment.
To have condence in the results above we must of course allow other potential determining
factors to enter the specication. Table 4 adds additional exogenous controls to our core
specication. The rst, and most obvious, alternative we consider is a country's level of eco-
nomic development. Richer countries may be able to aord systems of regulation unavailable
to poorer countries. However, it likely that contemporaneous, and even more recent, levels
of wealth will be partly determined by the ease of doing business. To minimise the likelihood
of endogeneity, we use 1970 levels of GDP per capita as our measure of economic develop-
ment. With notable exceptions, prosperity today is highly correlated with prosperity in the
not too distant past. If we accept this argument, Column 1 shows that (historically) richer
countries do not have a statistically dierent quality of business regulation and that our key
corruption result holds.
Another plausible determinant of the quality of regulation is the origin of a country's legal
tradition. Previous empirical research has established a strong association between dierent
legal traditions and a broad range of regulatory outcomes, including the protection of in-
vestors (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1998)), the burden of entry regulations (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes and Shleifer (2002)), and the regulation of labour markets (Botero, Djankov, La
Porta and Shleifer (2004)). Dummy variables for French and British legal origin are in-
cluded in Column 2. Both of these variables are insignicant (though of expected sign)
and the corruption variable maintains its signicance. In Column 3, we examine whether a
socialist history plays any role and nd that it does not.
The remaining columns examine whether geography has any role to play. Column 4 includes
the logs of both population and area. Both are highly signicant though our main result
continues to hold. Larger countries tend to have less business friendly policies. This suggests
that it is more dicult to keep watch over a large area and perhaps some of the diculty
is passed onto rms. Larger populations seem to be good for business friendly regulation,
perhaps because of economies of scale in regulatory technology. Column 5 is an attempt
to allow for \neighbourhood" eects by including dummies for Western Europe and Sub-
Saharan Africa. There seems to be no advantage to being surrounded by relatively auent
neighbours, but there is a penalty to being surrounded by relatively poor ones. Once again
our main result holds.
14Table 4: Robustness III: Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 242.184 225.163 206.625 218.623 173.083
(51.159) (22.996) (22.124) (29.280) (32.474)
Constraints on -7.310 -12.638 -8.429 -9.179 -3.167
Executive Power (5.647) (6.767) (6.597) (5.951) (6.697)
Corruption -14.410 -14.721 -16.067 -15.371 -16.602
Perceptions Index (5.212) (4.797) (3.753) (3.495) (5.230)
Log of 1970 GDP -5.756
Per Capita (7.418)
French Legal Origin 5.736
(14.856)




Log of Area 6.683
(2.066)
Log of Population -9.655
(3.374)
Western Europe Dummy 8.762
(17.302)
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy 22.084
(10.978)
Over-ID Test P-Value 0.65 0.24 0.63 0.80 0.86
First Stage F Statistic on:
Constraints on Executive Power 21.37 23.36 27.50 17.66 25.97
Corruption Perceptions Index 45.69 76.86 42.77 49.38 53.07
Notes: The dependent variable is the Ease of Doing Business Rank 2010. Estimation carried out using IV. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. N = 100. , and indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
15Table 5: Sample Splits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High-Middle Middle-Low Democratic Autocratic Stable\ Unstable\
Income Income States States Peaceful Violent
Constant 100.207 298.416 188.049 336.945 138.485 258.200
(58.451) (64.855) (94.385) (100.630) (36.072) (32.170)
Constraints on 9.797 -17.505 -3.996 -46.017 9.055 -17.314
Executive Power (14.020) (9.535) (20.100) (47.0484) (11.189) (7.974)
Corruption -18.166 -34.082 -17.390 -27.453 -22.522 -18.256
Perceptions Index (7.468) (15.456) (6.008) (12.965) (6.843) (9.974)
Over-ID Test P-Value 0.84 0.70 0.61 0.70 0.50 0.97
First Stage F Statistic on:
Constraints on Executive Power 4.81 2.61 24.05 4.28 11.91 4.88
Corruption Perceptions Index 7.90 2.80 69.62 8.81 13.88 4.33
Observations 46 54 77 23 42 58
Notes: The dependent variable is the Ease of Doing Business Rank 2010. Estimation carried out using IV. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. , and indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
5.3 Sample Splits
The previous section gives us condence that, in general, corruption is the key determinant of
good business regulation. In this section we extend the analysis by considering whether the
eects are dierent in groups of countries dened by three fundamental characteristics: the
level of economic development, the type of regime and the stability and level of violence in
the state. While we could include these as additional regressors, we would require additional
instruments to do so. Although splitting the sample is sub-optimal (especially in a macro
exercise where samples are small to begin with), we believe that the previous section has
demonstrated the robustness of our main nding. This extension is therefore justiable,
though the results should be taken as indicative rather than conclusive. This need for
caution is underlined by the unsatisfactory rst stage F statistics that we obtain for most of
these regressions.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 split the sample along the lines of economic development. The
sample used in Column 1 is comprised of high income and upper-middle income countries,
as dened by the World Bank, and Column 2 of the remainder. The impact of corruption
on policy is roughly twice as big in poorer countries relative to richer countries. Bearing
in mind the limitations of this approach, this reinforces the positive policy implication of
our main ndings: mitigating corruption can lead to big improvements in the quality of
regulation even in the absence of institutional reform, especially in developing countries.
16A similar result emerges in the case of democratic versus autocratic states as can be seen in
columns 3 and 4. We use the Polity IV measure of regime type which takes values between
-10 (fully autocratic) and +10 (fully democratic). We take a score of 0 as the minimum
for entry to the democratic sample. Again we see a larger response to corruption in what
to Western sensibilities would be the \bad" sample. Autocratic states tend towards less
transparent government and political decision-making which leaves much more room for
corruption. Furthermore, autocrats often lack the incentives to enforce anti-corruption laws,
as these could undermine their ability to stay in power.
The nal division is dened by the World Bank's WGI Political Stability, No Violence
(PSNV) index. Like the other WGI variables we have used, this takes values from -2.5 to
+2.5. We somewhat arbitrarily take a value of 0 for entry into the stable sample. The results
are striking. In more stable countries it is corruption that emerges as the key determinant.
However, in less stable environments it is institutional quality that wins out. This ts well
with intuition: in unstable and more violent environments, improving the rules of the game
becomes more important then stopping agents from breaking them. While striking, even
more care must be taken in this instance than in the other splits. PSNV is arguably a
measure of institutional quality itself and so the nding that better institutions matter more
in a sample of countries with bad institutions is less than surprising. Nevertheless, it does
suggest some role for targeted interventions if our policy prescription were to be followed by
development agencies.
5.4 Disaggregated Rankings
We have already noted that the Doing Business data is rich in quality but so far we have
neglected its impressive depth. This depth allows us to test our key result in another way
and also introduce a more nuanced hypothesis. Both theory and common sense suggest that
dierent aspects of regulation may have dierent determinants. Regulation in areas with
greater potential for rent extraction by ocials should be more driven by corruption, while
those with lesser potential for rent extraction should be more driven by institutional quality.
Table 6 reports the results obtained from running a race between our key variables on each
sub-rank. Corruption emerges as the signicant determinant in six out of the ten cases,
though only at the 10% level in the case of ease of protecting investors. If we put starting
and closing a business to one side for the moment, the remaining four reect day to day (or
at least recurring) elements of doing business. This reinforces our earlier claim and modies
it somewhat: no matter the rules of the game, repeated interactions between ocials and
their clients leads to worse regulation if corruption is prevalent. It is easy to imagine corrupt
ocials inventing new regulations to extract more bribes from businesses.
17Table 6: Sub-Rank Results
Ease of: Starting a Construction Employing Registering Getting Protecting Paying Foreign Enforcing Closing a
Business Permits Workers Property Credit Investors Taxes Trade Contracts Business
Constant 151.62 205.98 117.71 206.49 196.91 118.97 141.30 186.32 205.97 172.76
(24.50) (28.50) (27.85) (28.98) (24.37) (30.77) (25.86) (22.82) (26.45) (22.46)
Constraints on 1.67 -17.27 2.49 -19.86 -18.37 1.71 5.34 -4.86 -10.79 -2.02
Executive Power (7.36) (8.12) (7.97) (8.20) (6.78) (9.41) (7.79) (6.85) (8.02) (6.68)
Corruption -15.01 -4.30 -6.41 -2.28 -4.62 -10.00 -16.41 -16.59 -12.93 -18.29
Perceptions Index (4.46) (4.86) (4.99) (4.92) (4.04) (5.66) (4.57) (3.80) (4.79) (3.90)
Over-ID Test 0.31 0.91 0.38 0.64 0.37 0.96 0.85 0.11 0.72 0.41
Notes: The dependent variable is the indicated Doing Business sub-rank in 2010. Estimation carried out using IV. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. The first stage F statistics are 27.27 for constraints on executive power and 47.91 for the corruption perceptions
index. N = 100. , and indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Starting and closing a business are one o events (in the life of a particular enterprise) where
there is the potential to capture relatively large rents. It is easy to imagine an entrepreneur
who is looking to start a business and make some money being prepared to grease the palm
of a corrupt ocial who can stop or delay his investment. Likewise, owners and creditors of
failed businesses are likely prepared to give away some of the value of the company's assets
to expedite matters.
In three cases we nd that institutional quality is the key determinant: ease of obtaining
construction permits, ease of registering property and ease of getting credit. Interestingly,
these three t the bill of business regulation the least. Each is only tangentially related to the
business environment, at least compared to the six where corruption is the key determinant.
This further supports the idea that corruption requires frequent and repeated interaction
with ocials to become detrimental to regulatory quality. Otherwise, it is the general
framework that is key.20
6 Conclusions
We have presented a wide range of evidence that the quality of business regulation is de-
termined by the level of corruption. Our main nding is robust to additional exogenous
historical and geographic controls and alternative measures of the main variables. We ex-
tended our analysis to consider whether the causal story diers according to key country-
20In the case of ease of employing workers, neither institutions or corruption are signicant. Our prior
expectation was that institutions would be the key factor as employment is a private arrangement that for
the most part does not require the attention of state agents. It may be that employment regulation is driven
by the character of institutions (\socialist" or \capitalist") rather than by their quality.
18characteristics, namely the level of economic development, political regime, and the level of
stability and violence. Again, we nd that corruption determines the quality of regulation in
all but the most volatile political environments. We also extended the analysis to encompass
the disaggregated rankings of the Doing Business indicator. Here, our ndings suggest that
where there is more potential for rent extract, regulation is driven by corruption rather than
institutional quality.
Taken together, our ndings imply that a country can have \bad" institutions and a good
business environment as long as societal actors follow the \rules of the game" no matter
how bad they are in general. This has clear policy implications. To improve the business
environment, targeted eorts to curb corruption can yield signicant benets. Wholesale
institutional reform, while potentially yielding other benets, is not the most eective way to
improve regulation of the business environment. Corruption is not easy to eradicate or even
curb, but it is certainly an easier task than wholesale institutional reform, as institutions
are among the most durable and persistent aspects of any society.
Another way of interpreting our ndings depends on whether eective regulation is a good
proxy for the quality of a country's overall economic policy. If one were to adopt this
view, a positive message emerges: in the absence of widespread corruption, even poor and
ineective institutions can produce eective economic policy decisions. States and societies
are not necessarily a hostage of their history or institutional structures, though geography
does seem to play some role.
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